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Abstract 1 
 Experiences that contradict one’s core concepts (e.g. of the world, people, the self) 2 
elicit intense emotions. Such schema incongruence can elicit awe, wherein experiences that 3 
are too vast to understand with existing cognitive schemata cause one to feel that schemata 4 
should be updated [i.e., a “need for cognitive accommodation” (NFA); Keltner & Haidt, 5 
2003]. However, other emotional responses to schema incongruence, such as horror, have not 6 
been investigated.  7 
The current studies compared awe and horror to investigate if they are distinct 8 
schema-incongruent emotional responses. Study 1 observed significant differences between 9 
awe and horror in cognitive appraisals (e.g., certainty, legitimacy), indicating several areas of 10 
dissimilarity. Study 2 found evidence that awe and horror are both responses to schema-11 
incongruence, as schema incongruence and NFA were salient in awe and horror, but not a 12 
contrast emotion. However, awe and horror were elicited by different types of schema 13 
incongruence: awe by spiritual vastness, horror by extremity. Awe-eliciting experiences also 14 
appeared to be easier to assimilate than horrifying experiences, as NFA and uncertainty were 15 
significantly lower in awe than in horror. Differences in the functions of horror and awe are 16 
also discussed.   17 
Word count: 185 18 




“[L]ike it or not, Auschwitz expands the universe of consciousness no less than 3 
landing on the moon.” – Miller, 2004   4 
Introduction 5 
Emotions are shaped by cognitive schemata. Schemata, patterns of cognition that 6 
organize knowledge and conceptual relationships (Fiske & Linville, 1980), are developed via 7 
experience and help us quickly appraise events. In turn, these appraisals elicit emotions 8 
(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). If a situation is consistent with one’s cognitive schemata, it elicits 9 
an emotion that motivates adaptive behavioural responses (Keltner & Gross, 1999) and 10 
reinforces the schemata that guided it (Clore & Gasper, 2000). But what is the emotional 11 
response to experiences that are incommensurable with one’s existing schemata? 12 
This paper proposes that events and phenomena that violate mental representations of 13 
the world elicit “schema-incongruent emotions” that motivate not just behavioural responses, 14 
but also cognitive restructuring of the categories through which one interprets the world, i.e., 15 
cognitive accommodation (Piaget, 1950). Awe is one such schema-incongruent emotion 16 
(Keltner & Haidt, 2003) and horror is another. Although some view horror as a subtype of 17 
awe (Gordon et al., 2017; Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007), the current studies provide 18 
evidence that they are different emotional responses.  19 
Although the emotional components of awe have been investigated (e.g., Bonner & 20 
Friedman, 2011; Shiota et al., 2007), horror has yet to be investigated as a natural 21 
emotion[insert footnote 1 here]. However, horror appears to exhibit the five components of 22 
emotion (Scherer, 2005): Darwin (1872) described horror’s facial expression and 23 
biophysiological symptoms, PTSD researchers[insert footnote 2 here] (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 24 
  
1992) and philosophers (Carroll, 1990) have detailed the subjective experience of horror, 1 
survival psychology has described horror’s action tendencies (Leach, 1994) and linguistic 2 
analysis has identified appraisals that distinguish horror from other fear states (Wierzbicka, 3 
1988).  4 
Emotional responses to schema incongruence 5 
 Cognitive schemata are generalised beliefs about the self and the world that help 6 
humans efficiently understand and categorise information and experiences. They operate 7 
automatically and can be activated by external stimuli without conscious awareness (Nisbett 8 
& Wilson, 1977; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). Schemata are resilient against disconfirmation: 9 
information that does not fit is usually discounted, ignored, reappraised or revised to be 10 
consistent with current schemata (Lodge & Taber, 2000). Such “cognitive assimilation” is 11 
efficient and maintains a consistent worldview, so it is the default human information-12 
processing style (Piaget, 1950).  13 
However, experiences that cannot be explained with existing schemata are often 14 
relevant to survival (e.g., signal changes to vital environmental or social resources). Thus, the 15 
adaptive cognitive response to schema incongruence is to update one’s schemata accurately, 16 
without schema-driven alteration (Diamond & Zoladz, 2016). This is “cognitive 17 
accommodation”, which entails bottom-up, stimulus-driven information processing (as 18 
opposed to the top-down, schema-driven information processing of assimilation; Bless & 19 
Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler & Bless, 2000). The difference between assimilation and 20 
accommodation can be illustrated with the example of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in which 21 
terrorists flew two planes into the World Trade Centre in New York. Immediately after the 22 
first plane hit, people assimilated the news by interpreting the event as an accident, which 23 
was consistent with the schemata it activated (e.g., airline crashes). However, the second 24 
  
plane strike invalidated the accident interpretation and forced people to accommodate their 1 
understanding of the world to incorporate a new reality (Yum & Schenck-Hamlin, 2005).  2 
Emotional responses to schema-incongruence may facilitate cognitive accommodation 3 
by increasing neurocognitive plasticity (Diamond, Campbell, Park, Halonen, & Zoladz, 2007) 4 
and weakening the attitudes, beliefs and assumptions that would otherwise facilitate 5 
assimilation (Dalgleish & Power, 2004; Lodge & Taber, 2000). This is experienced as a 6 
“need for cognitive accommodation” (NFA): the perception that one cannot assimilate an 7 
experience into existing schemata and should therefore modify one’s understanding of the 8 
world to make sense of it (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). NFA shifts attention away from internal 9 
knowledge structures and toward the external elicitor, privileging data-driven perceptual 10 
processing over meaning-making conceptual processing (Bless & Fiedler, 2006). In 11 
summary, schema-incongruent information both activates and violates a schema, which 12 
elicits intense emotions that increase cognitive plasticity and bottom-up processing to 13 
facilitate schematic revision.  14 
Two types of schema-incongruence: Vastness and extremity 15 
“Schema incongruence” is how much an experience or entity deviates from “the self's 16 
ordinary level of experience or frame of reference" (Shiota et al., 2007, p. 945). Because 17 
schemata are “cognitive manifestations of psychological needs” (e.g., security, interpersonal 18 
belonging; McCann & Pearlman, 1990), they are sensitive to changes in one’s physical and 19 
social environments that affect one’s ability to satisfy these needs. Different types of schema 20 
incongruence elicit different responses, depending on what signals they give about the 21 
environment. 22 
Some types of schema-incongruity – such as vastness – signal new opportunities to 23 
meet one’s needs (e.g., abundant nature, extraordinary people, spiritual forces). Vast 24 
phenomena exist on a scale beyond full human comprehension and typically elicit awe 25 
  
(Keltner & Haidt, 2003), which is associated with increased schematic flexibility that helps 1 
one capitalise on the opportunities signalled by vastness (Armstrong & Detweiler-Bedell, 2 
2008; Shiota et al., 2007). Awe-eliciting vastness causes categories to become more inclusive 3 
(Shiota et al., 2007), less egocentric (Piff, Dietze, Feinberg, Stancato, & Keltner, 2015) and 4 
more metaphysically-oriented (Van Cappellen & Saroglou, 2012) and can increase 5 
perceptions of purpose, meaning and order in the world (Valdesolo & Graham, 2014).  6 
Conversely, another type of schema-incongruity – extremity – signals that vital 7 
resources, relationships or assumptions have become unviable or dangerous and one must 8 
adapt to meet one’s needs. Similar to biological extremity (i.e., conditions too abnormal to 9 
acclimate to and therefore necessitate adaptation; Gutschick & BassiriRad, 2003), extremity 10 
is constituted by events or behaviors that deviate too much from basic world assumptions to 11 
be assimilated, and instead require schematic accommodation. Extremity exceeds the limits 12 
of comprehensibility or presumed possibility and is thus evaluated as “unthinkable” and 13 
elicits appraisals associated with horror, such as, “I didn’t think that something like this could 14 
happen” (Wierzbicka, 1988). For example, although deception and aggression are considered 15 
morally wrong, they are understandable: “Most people can conceive of themselves lying, 16 
stealing, breaking a promise, robbing a store, hitting someone, even killing”. However, 17 
extreme deception or aggression “baffles understanding” and “stretch[es] our imaginations, 18 
our understanding of what human beings are capable of” because it is “conduct that one 19 
cannot conceive of oneself engaging in” (Singer, 2004, p. 195-196).  20 
Vastness and extremity violate different schematic aspects. Vastness is a spatial or 21 
conceptual expansiveness that violates schematic scale expectations and reveals the limits of 22 
one’s knowledge. For example, someone whose experience with trees has been limited to 23 
12m tall trees will have their concept of nature’s scale violated by seeing a 110m tall tree, 24 
which will motivate adjustment of that schema’s spatial criteria. Because this schema 25 
  
incongruity does not contradict other defining schematic traits, this accommodation is not 1 
problematic. In contrast, extremity typically contradicts or negates core schematic traits. In 2 
extremity (i.e., excessive conceptual distance from schematic norms), an entity (often a 3 
person) exhibits a trait or behavior to a disproportionate degree that violates basic schematic 4 
criteria for category inclusion. For example, the schema of “parent” includes both protecting 5 
and disciplining one’s child. But a parent whose extreme “discipline” contravenes 6 
“protection” (e.g., starving a child as punishment) violates the “parent” schema. To 7 
accommodate this attribute-level schema incongruity, either the perpetrator must be 8 
dissociated from the category (e.g., create new schema of “unfit parents”) or the “parent” 9 
schemata must change to acknowledge that all parents can act similarly.  10 
Awe and horror are distinct emotional responses to schema incongruence 11 
We propose that awe and horror are two different emotional responses to schema 12 
incongruence. Schema-incongruent emotions are a subcategory of “knowledge emotions” 13 
(e.g., surprise, interest, confusion), which are elicited by challenges to one’s thoughts and 14 
knowledge (Silvia, 2010). We propose that schema-incongruent emotions are distinct among 15 
knowledge emotions in being elicited by global challenges to one’s schematic structures (i.e., 16 
how one’s worldview is organized), rather than local challenges to the content of one’s 17 
knowledge. Whereas trivial aberrations or novelties elicit surprise, confusion or interest, awe 18 
and horror are elicited by contradictions of core schemata (e.g., moral values).  19 
Because awe and horror both involve schema incongruence and NFA, some have 20 
speculated that horror is a combination of fear and awe (Shiota et al., 2007) or a subtype of 21 
awe (Gordon et al., 2017, Study 2b). However, empirical and theoretical research indicates 22 
that awe and horror are different emotional responses to different types of schema 23 
incongruence. Awe is elicited by entities and actions that enhance and strengthen systems of 24 
meaning (Yaden, Haidt, Hood, Vago, & Newberg, 2017), such as art and moral excellence 25 
  
(Shiota et al., 2007). In contrast, horror elicitors, such as catastrophe and cruelty, undermine 1 
systems of meaning (Kristeva, 1982). Thus, they have opposite effects on basic world 2 
assumptions: horror “shatters” them (Janoff-Bulman, 1992), but awe affirms or expands them 3 
(Van Cappellen, Saroglou, Iweins, Piovesana, & Fredrickson, 2013).  4 
Horror may sometimes be conflated with awe because both can involve fear (Gordon 5 
et al., 2017; Piff et al., 2015). However, the fear in awe and horror differ in several aspects. 6 
First, fear is central to horror, but peripheral and non-essential to awe (Bonner & Friedman, 7 
2011; Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Second, whereas horror is a response to physical or existential 8 
damage (Cavell, 1979), the fearful aspects of awe are appraised as benign (Bonner & 9 
Friedman, 2011). Third, the fear in awe reflects respect or deference towards power (Keltner 10 
& Haidt, 2003), but in horror is antagonistic to the elicitor and rejects it as abhorrent and 11 
unnatural (Carroll, 1990; Kristeva, 1982). Fourth, horrified fear is a response to the 12 
realization that actual harm is currently occurring or has occurred (Cavell, 1979), but fear in 13 
awe is felt towards the hypothetical harm a powerful elicitor could cause in the future (Kant, 14 
1790/1951).   15 
Awe and horror also have different cognitive effects. Awe can expand ontological 16 
schemata beyond the material world, leading to metaphysical inferences (Valdesolo & 17 
Graham, 2014), feelings of personal connection with higher powers (Piff et al., 2015) and in-18 
group members (Krause & Hayward, 2015) and a reduced sense of a personal self (Yaden et 19 
al., 2017). In contrast, horrifying experiences disrupt schemata related to safety, trust, power, 20 
self-esteem and/or intimacy (Lisa McCann, Sakheim, & Abrahamson, 1988). 21 
The Present Research  22 
The goal of this research is to investigate if awe and horror are different emotional 23 
responses to schema-incongruent experiences. To test this, we investigated if they differ in 24 
cognitive appraisals (Study 1) and elicitors (Study 2). Additionally, to test if awe and horror 25 
  
are both responses to schema-incongruence, we investigated if schema-incongruence and 1 
NFA were greater in awe and horror than in the schema-congruent emotion of contentment 2 
(Study 2).  3 
Study 1: Cognitive appraisals in awe and horror  4 
Study 1 compared cognitive appraisals in awe and horror to investigate how they are 5 
different and similar.  6 
Hypothesis 1: because horror is aversive, Horror[insert footnote 3 here] will have 7 
lower attention-related appraisals (e.g., focusing on the elicitor) than Awe. 8 
Hypothesis 2: because horror is associated with survival situations, Horror will have 9 
higher appraisals of goal-path obstacles and anticipated effort than Awe.  10 
Hypothesis 3: because horror is associated with interpersonal conflict, Horror will 11 
have higher appraisals of external human agency and lower appraisals of legitimacy and 12 
pleasantness than Awe. 13 
Hypothesis 4: because we assume that both are schema-incongruent emotions, we 14 
predicted that Awe and Horror will have similarly low appraisals of certainty (i.e., high NFA) 15 




Two-hundred-and-nineteen participants recruited on Mechanical Turk completed a 20 
“survey on emotional experiences” for US$1.25. Participants were required to be U.S.-born 21 
native English speakers who were at least 18 years old and had not lived outside the U.S. for 22 
more than two years. Participants exhibiting any of the following were excluded from 23 
analysis: failed an attention check item, did not follow directions on open-response questions 24 
  
(e.g., did not write about a specific event), exhibited answer straight-lining (low response 1 
variance, sd < .50 for all Likert responses) or rated feeling the target emotion “not at all”. 2 
Thirty-one participants’ data were excluded, leaving 188 participants for analysis[insert 3 
footnote 5 here]  (Mage = 36.80, SDage = 11.17, Range = 20-71; 96 females, 89 males, 2 other; 4 
76.4% European American, 9.9% African American, 1.1% Latino, 3.2% Asian American, 5 
0.5% South Asian, 8.5% mixed race). A post-hoc power analysis[insert footnote 6 here] using 6 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated 92% power to detect medium-7 
sized effects (d = .5) in independent t-tests with a .05 two-tailed type 1 error probability.  8 
Procedure 9 
After providing consent, participants were randomly assigned to the Awe condition or 10 
the Horror condition and asked to recall a personal experience of the target emotion, defined 11 
as: 12 
“[Awe/Horror] is an emotion felt towards something vast[insert footnote 7 here] that 13 
you can’t fully understand at the time, in which…” 14 
Awe Condition: “…you feel someone or something is amazing or sublime.” 15 
Horror Condition: “…someone or something was harmed or damaged.” 16 
Participants responded to the prompt via nine open-response questions adapted from 17 
Smith & Ellsworth (1985; e.g., “What happened to make you feel awe/horror?”). Next, 18 
participants rated cognitive and emotional appraisals of the target experience.[insert footnote 19 
8 here] Lastly, they provided demographic information and were debriefed.  20 
Measures  21 
Cognitive appraisals. Participants rated 23 items measuring nine appraisal domains of 22 
the target experience adapted from Smith and Ellsworth (1985) using a nine-point Likert 23 
scale (1=“not at all”, 9=“extremely”; see Supplementary Materials for item-level 24 
  
means)[insert footnote 9 here]. The items for each domain were averaged to form aggregate 1 
variables (see Table 1).  2 
Manipulation check. Participants rated how much they felt awe and horror during the 3 
situation (presented among twenty emotion items) on a 7-point scale (1=“not at all”, 4 
7=“extremely”).  5 
Results  6 
Manipulation check  7 
Welch’s t-tests showed that awe was higher in the Awe condition and horror was 8 
higher in the Horror condition (see Table 1). Awe and horror were uncorrelated in both 9 
conditions, rs ≤ |.07|, ps ≥ .51. 10 
Appraisal dimensions 11 
 Welch’s t-tests showed Awe and Horror differed in cognitive appraisals (see Table 12 
1). Consistent with Hypotheses 1–3, appraisals of attentional activity and fairness were 13 
greater in Awe, appraisals of external human agency, goal-path obstacles and anticipated 14 
effort were greater in Horror, and appraisals of situational agency were equal between 15 
conditions. However, contrary to Hypothesis 4, personal agency and certainty were 16 
significantly higher in Awe than in Horror.[insert footnote 10 here] 17 
 [Table 1 near here]  18 
Discussion  19 
Emotion ratings for awe and horror were uncorrelated and between-condition mean-20 
differences had large effect sizes, supporting our general hypothesis that horror and awe are 21 
different emotional experiences.  22 
Awe and Horror differed in eight of nine appraisal dimensions. Horror had lower 23 
appraisals of self-agency and certainty, which, combined with appraisals of greater goal-path 24 
  
obstacles and anticipated effort, indicate coping anxiety, possibly because horrifying 1 
situations have physical or cognitive demands that exceed one’s abilities (Leach, 1994). In 2 
contrast, the low appraisals of anticipated effort and goal-path obstacles in Awe may indicate 3 
that the physical world and its constraints were less salient (e.g., self-transcendence; Yaden, 4 
Haidt, et al., 2017).  5 
Contrary to Hypothesis 4, certainty was higher in Awe than in Horror. Other research 6 
similarly found that certainty was higher in positive awe than negative "threat-based awe" 7 
(Gordon et al., 2017), but the effect size observed here is three times larger. This could 8 
indicate that horror involves greater NFA than awe or that horrific NFA is more difficult to 9 
resolve (Dalgleish & Power, 2004). It is also possible that spontaneous meaning-making 10 
helps accommodate schema-incongruence in awe (e.g. Valdesolo & Graham, 2014) but not in 11 
horror.  12 
Situational agency was the only appraisal dimension with no between-condition 13 
difference. However, situational agency appraisals probably reflect different attribution 14 
targets in the two emotions (Brewin & Shapiro, 1984). In Awe, situational agency may reflect 15 
feelings of self-transcendence or a “small self” (Piff et al., 2015). In contrast, because horror 16 
is elicited by harm and involves blame-related appraisals (external human agency, low 17 
legitimacy), situational agency in horror may reflect hostility and blame (Feigenson, 2002) or 18 
feelings of personal helplessness or dissociation (Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  19 
One limitation of Study 1 was that it only compared awe and horror against each 20 
other. Thus, we can discuss how they differ from each other, but not how they might be 21 
similar relative to schema-congruent emotions. Therefore, Study 2 included a contrast 22 
condition.  23 
  
Study 2: Vastness and NFA in awe and horror 1 
We propose that both awe and horror are elicited by schema incongruence and result 2 
in NFA. To test if schema incongruence and NFA are greater in awe and horror than a 3 
schema-congruent emotion, Study 2 contrasted awe and horror with contentment, which is 4 
elicited by schema congruent experiences, such as the satisfaction of basic needs and goals 5 
(Berenbaum, 2002). 6 
 Hypothesis 1: Awe and Horror will have significantly more schema incongruence 7 
than Contentment. 8 
Hypothesis 2: Awe and Horror will have significantly more NFA than Contentment. 9 
An additional exploratory purpose of this study was to investigate what types of 10 
experiences elicit awe and horror. To do so, a qualitative analysis was performed on 11 
participants’ written descriptions of awe and horror. Because coding categories were created 12 
using inductive analysis, we had only one hypothesis about elicitors: 13 
Hypothesis 3: Horror will be elicited by harm more frequently than Awe. 14 
Method 15 
Participants 16 
One-hundred-and-eighty-one participants recruited on Mechanical Turk participated 17 
for US$2.00. Participant requirements and exclusion criteria were identical to Study 1, 18 
resulting in the exclusion of 47 participants’ data[insert footnote 11 here], leaving 134 for 19 
analysis (females = 81, males = 53; Mage = 38.55, SDage = 12.21, Range = 20-64; 76.1% 20 
European American, 7.5% African American, 5.2% East Asian American, 2.2% South Asian 21 
or Indian, 1.5% Latino or Hispanic, 0.7% Middle Eastern, 0.7% Native American, 5% mixed 22 
ethnicity, 0.7% chose not to answer). A post-hoc power analysis[insert footnote 12 here] 23 
using G*Power indicated 93% power to detect medium-sized effects in chi-square tests (φ 24 
= .3) with α = .05 and 95% power to detect medium-sized effects in omnibus within-factors 25 
  
ANOVAs (η2 = .06) using three repeated measures with α = .05 and post-hoc pairwise 1 
comparisons with Bonferroni-adjusted α = .017 (d = .5). 2 
Procedure 3 
A within-subjects design was used with three conditions (Awe, Horror, Contentment) 4 
randomly counterbalanced. After providing consent, participants were asked to “vividly 5 
recall a personal experience of [awe/horror/contentment] (not including experiences of 6 
fictional products, e.g., movies, books)” and write 3-5 sentences about it. After writing about 7 
the first target emotion, they rated its schema incongruence and NFA. This process was 8 
repeated for the second and third emotions in turn. Lastly, participants provided demographic 9 
data and were debriefed.  10 
To explore what elicits awe and horror, written responses for the Awe and Horror 11 
conditions were coded for elicitor categories. Categories were created via inductive coding by 12 
the first author. Two hypothesis-blind coders applied dichotomous (applicable, not 13 
applicable), non-mutually-exclusive elicitor codes to scenarios. The elicitor categories were: 14 
“another person(s)”[insert footnote 13 here], “event”, “nature”, “human-made objects”, 15 
“location or physical surroundings”, “information”[insert footnote 14 here] and “animals”. 16 
Additionally, to differentiate horror from negative threat-based awe, scenarios were coded 17 
with mutually-exclusive themes of “harm”, “death” and “threat without harm”, as well as a 18 
non-mutually exclusive theme of “silver linings” (i.e., something positive occurring during 19 
something negative). Thirty-four percent of scenarios[insert footnote 15 here] were coded by 20 
both coders and initial Krippendorf alphas ranged .69–1.00, M = .81.[insert footnote 16 here] 21 
Coding disagreements were resolved via three-way discussion with the first author.    22 
Measures  23 
Schema Incongruence and NFA. Items measuring schema incongruence and NFA 24 
were based on previous theoretical and empirical descriptions of schema incongruence in awe 25 
  
and horror (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Schurtz et al., 2012; Shiota et al., 1 
2007; Piff et al., 2015). Because current theory asserts that schema incongruence causes NFA 2 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Keltner & Haidt, 2003), schema incongruence items measured how 3 
much elicitors deviated from normality, and NFA items measured cognitive reactions to such 4 
deviations. All items were rated on five-point Likert scales.  5 
Schema Incongruence: Participants rated the schema incongruence of the eliciting 6 
experience in relative and absolute terms (see Tables 3 and S2). Relative incongruence 7 
measured deviance from “things you normally experience in everyday life” (-2=“much less 8 
than normal”, 0=“the same as normal”, +2=“much greater than normal”; remapped to 1–5 9 
scale for analysis). Absolute incongruence measured the applicability of general schema-10 
deviance qualities (1=“does not describe it at all”, 5=“describes it extremely well”). 11 
NFA items: Participants rated three aspects of NFA (see Tables 4 and S3): difficulty 12 
assimilating the experience (1=“does not describe it at all”, 5=“describes it extremely”), 13 
belief/value contradiction (1=“very much contradicted”, 3=“neither contradicted nor 14 
supported”, 5=“very much supported”; answers reverse-coded for analysis) and cognitive 15 
emotions (1=“did not feel this at all”, 5=“felt this extremely”). 16 
Manipulation check. Participants rated how much awe, horror and contentment they 17 
felt during the experience (1=“did not feel at all”; 5=“felt extremely”), embedded within ten 18 
emotion items. 19 
Results 20 
Manipulation check   21 
One-way within-subjects ANOVAs with condition as the within-subjects factor 22 
confirmed that each emotion was significantly greater within its target condition (all omnibus 23 
and pairwise ps < .001, η2s ≤ .63). Ratings for awe and horror were uncorrelated in all 24 
conditions, rs ≤ |.10|, ps ≥ .23.  25 
  
Writing Prompt Responses  1 
Awe and Horror differed in all elicitor categories (see Table 2).  2 
[Table 2 near here] 3 
Consistent with the proportions observed in Gordon et al. (2017), 10.4% of Awe 4 
scenarios involved either harm, death or threat without harm. However, among the 5 
death/harm/threat situations in Awe, 69% also contained “silver linings” (e.g., altruistic self-6 
sacrifice, a dying person’s positive attitude), indicating that awe elicited by negative 7 
experiences often involves positive appraisals. In contrast, 86.9% of the horror scenarios 8 
were elicited by harm/death/threat (e.g., car crash, suicide), χ2 = 149.83, p < .001, and 0% 9 
contained silver linings, indicating no positive appraisals of horrifying situations. Thus, 10 
Hypothesis 3 was supported.  11 
Schema incongruence  12 
Schema incongruence items were reduced using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 13 
with Maximum Likelihood extraction and promax rotation in SPSS. A two-factor structure 14 
was observed (see Table 3).[insert footnote 17 here] The first factor was interpreted as 15 
Extremity (α = .84) and comprised items describing atypicality and excessive effects. The 16 
second factor was interpreted as Spiritual Vastness (α  = .82) and comprised items describing 17 
expansive perceptions and metaphysical inferences. Standardised regression factor scores 18 
were used in subsequent analyses. 19 
[Table 3 near here] 20 
To test Hypothesis 1, one-way within-subjects ANOVAs were conducted on 21 
Extremity and Spiritual Vastness with condition (Awe, Horror, Contentment) as the within-22 
subjects factor. There was a significant main effect for Extremity, F(2, 266) = 213.07, p 23 
< .001,  η2 = .62. Post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments indicated 24 
  
Extremity was higher in Horror than in Awe or Contentment, and higher in Awe than 1 
Contentment (all ps < .001; see Figure 1).  2 
There was a significant main effect for Spiritual Vastness, F(1.78, 236) = 93.08 3 
with .89 Greenhouse-Geisser correction, p < .001,  η2 = .41. Pairwise comparisons indicated 4 
Spiritual Vastness was higher in Awe than in Horror or Contentment, and higher in 5 
Contentment than Horror (all ps < .001; see Figure 1).  6 
Thus, two types of schema incongruence were observed (Extremity and Spiritual 7 
Vastness) and, supporting Hypothesis 1, Extremity was salient in Horror, Spiritual Vastness 8 
was salient in Awe and neither were salient in Contentment.  9 
[Figure 1 near here] 10 
NFA  11 
NFA items were reduced using a Maximum Likelihood EFA with promax rotation. 12 
Two factors emerged (see Table 4).[insert footnote 18 here] The first factor was interpreted 13 
as Shock (α = .89) and comprised items indicating the difficulty in cognitive assimilation. The 14 
second factor was interpreted as Chaos (α = .76) and comprised items indicating disorienting 15 
mismatches with existing epistemic systems (Neimeyer, Herrero, & Botella, 2006). 16 
Regression factor scores were used for subsequent analyses. 17 
[Table 4 near here] 18 
To test Hypothesis 2, one-way within-subjects ANOVAs were conducted on Shock 19 
and Chaos with condition as the within-subjects factor. There was a main effect for Shock, 20 
F(1.82, 242) = 154.69 with .90 Greenhouse-Geisser correction, p < .001,  η2 = 54. Post hoc 21 
Bonferroni pairwise comparisons indicated Shock was higher in Horror than in Awe, p < .001 22 
and Contentment, and higher in Awe than Contentment, p < .008 (Figure 2). 23 
There was a main effect for Chaos, F(2, 266) = 217.43 with .91 Greenhouse-Geisser 24 
correction , p < .001,  η2 = .65, and pairwise comparisons indicated Chaos was higher in 25 
  
Horror than in Awe, p < .001, but did not differ between Awe and Contentment, p = .90 1 
(Figure 2).   2 
[Figure 2 near here] 3 
Discussion  4 
  Results from Study 2 indicated that both awe and horror are elicited by schema 5 
incongruence and cause greater NFA than contentment. The data also provide further 6 
evidence that awe and horror are empirically differentiable based on differences in elicitor 7 
and type of schema incongruence.  8 
 Qualitative analysis indicated that awe and horror are elicited by different types of 9 
experiences. Horror was usually elicited by harmful events, but awe rarely was. Further, awe 10 
at harmful events was usually not felt toward the harm itself, but toward something positive 11 
occurring despite the harmful situation. Such “silver linings” were completely absent from 12 
horror scenarios. Additionally, horror (but not awe) was frequently elicited by information 13 
(rather than first-hand witnessing), indicating that “the mere thought of” schema-incongruent 14 
harm can elicit horror. In contrast, awe relies more on sensory perception (Shiota et al., 15 
2007). Thus, unlike negative threat-based awe, which has the same elicitors as positive awe 16 
(e.g., nature; Gordon et al., 2017)  horror had distinctly different elicitors, providing further 17 
evidence that horror is not a fearful variant of awe.  18 
Horror and Awe had significantly higher levels of schema incongruence and NFA 19 
than Contentment, supporting the hypothesis that awe and horror are schema-incongruent 20 
emotional responses. However, awe and horror appear to be differentiable based on what type 21 
of schema incongruence is salient: transgressive Extremity in Horror, transcendent Spiritual 22 
Vastness in Awe.  23 
The high Chaos in Horror (i.e., confusion due to contradictions of one’s beliefs and 24 
values) supports philosophical arguments that horrific things damage systems of meaning. It 25 
  
also indicates that not all harm elicits horror, only senseless harm that violates our values; 1 
morally justifiable harm may fail to horrify us (Rai, Valdesolo, & Graham, 2017).  2 
While Horror involved high levels of NFA, Awe did not. Awe showed relatively mild 3 
Shock coupled with and amazement at something that supports schemata (i.e., the inverse of 4 
Chaos). However, because belief-consistent information has greater power to change one’s 5 
way of thinking (Fugelsang & Dunbar, 2005), one possibility is that mildly shocking 6 
experiences that support one’s beliefs and values lead to euphoric accommodation (e.g., 7 
epiphany, enlightenment).  8 
General discussion 9 
These studies offer evidence that awe and horror are distinctly different emotional 10 
responses to schema incongruence. Awe and horror differed in cognitive appraisals (Study 1), 11 
schema-incongruence and elicitors (Study 2). Awe was typically elicited by spiritually vast 12 
experiences of nature, people, events and locations, whereas horror was elicited by harmful 13 
events and extremity.  14 
Both awe and horror involved NFA, but the NFA in awe was relatively mild, possibly 15 
indicating some degree of belief-driven assimilation. Although awe involved NFA (Shock), it 16 
also involved moderately high appraisals of certainty (for similar midscale appraisals of 17 
certainty, see Gordon et al., 2017; Tong & Jia, 2017) and amazement at things that support 18 
existing values and worldviews (low Chaos), indicating that the experiences were not 19 
difficult to assimilate. Previous research similarly found that NFA is either not salient in awe 20 
(e.g., not greater in awe relative to a contrast emotion, negatively correlated with awe ratings; 21 
Schurtz et al., 2012) or less salient than vastness (e.g., lower ratings, smaller neutral-contrast 22 
effect sizes; Chirico et al., 2017; Chirico, Ferrise, Cordella, & Gaggioli, 2018). The relatively 23 
low salience of NFA may be due to the “noetic” sense of revelation and intuitive insight often 24 
  
reported in awe (James, 1902), which would increase appraisals of certainty (Yaden et al., 1 
2017). Thus, accommodation in awe is not based on schema-conflict resolution, but rather 2 
schematic expansion (Shiota et al., 2007), wherein schemata attain a broader scope of 3 
meaning and greater explanatory weight (Fugelsang & Dunbar, 2005).  4 
However, the low NFA in awe raises the question of whether awe involves top-down 5 
assimilation. According to Fiedler & Bless (2000), assimilation involves “appetitive 6 
learning” (e.g., exploratory behaviour, self-efficacy, approach motivations) that alters stimuli 7 
to match schemata. With this in mind, many of awe’s effects indicate schema-driven 8 
assimilation rather than stimulus-driven accommodation (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler & 9 
Bless, 2000): awe facilitates inferential abstractions (Valdesolo & Graham, 2014), 10 
strengthens pre-existing beliefs (Valdesolo, Shtulman, & Baron, 2016), expands “oceanic” 11 
categorization (Shiota et al., 2007), increases exploratory behaviour (e.g., using a greater 12 
number of unique actions to interact with a novel object; Colantonio & Bonawitz, 2018) and 13 
facilitates creative thinking (Chirico, Glaveanu, Cipresso, Riva, & Gaggioli, 2018). However, 14 
creating unusual or novel connections between semantically distant concepts does not 15 
transform or create new schemata. Creativity, imagination and play are assimilative processes 16 
that use internal schemata to identify conceptual similarities in external stimuli and shape the 17 
stimuli so they more clearly manifest schemata (Piaget, 1962). In contrast, in 18 
accommodation, the external stimulus alters internal cognitive structures so they more 19 
accurately reflect stimuli (e.g., imitation, not creativity).  20 
The differences between awe and horror indicate different adaptive functions (Keltner 21 
& Gross, 1999). It has been proposed that awe supports group-level fitness via the 22 
downstream social effects of collective bonding, such as broadened social resources (Stellar 23 
et al., 2017), prosociality and stabilised social hierarchies (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). In 24 
contrast, horror may facilitate individual survival via its effects on cognition. Horror involves 25 
  
recognition of painful truths that create a more complex worldview that “inoculates” against 1 
psychological malfunction (Janoff-Bulman, 2006) and stress-related impairments of working 2 
memory and executive function (Leach, 2012) during subsequent extreme situations. The 3 
immediate effects of horror likely include arousal, attentive immobility and intense memory 4 
of the elicitor, which enhance learning about dangerous, novel or unpredictable 5 
environments, such as those encountered during migration or great ecological or societal 6 
change (Diamond & Zoladz, 2016).  7 
Limitations, contributions and future directions 8 
Although the studies presented here have shown that the emotional appraisal 9 
dimensions and elicitors of horror are different than those in awe, they do not furnish enough 10 
evidence to declare that horror qualifies as a distinct emotion. These studies act as first step 11 
towards future empirical investigations that can clarify this issue. 12 
One methodological limitation arising from the lack of prior empirical data on horror 13 
is that, because its elicitor qualities were unclear, we used retrospective recall to elicit the 14 
target emotions, a technique common in emotion research, including research on awe (Shiota 15 
et al., 2007; Griskevicius et al. 2010; Gordon et al., 2017), but one that is vulnerable to 16 
memory biases (Bradburn et al., 1987). Future studies should use standardized elicitors, such 17 
as photos and films, to confirm and expand on the findings presented here. One interesting 18 
area of inquiry would be awe and horror differ physiologically. For example, awe involves 19 
sympathetic nervous system withdrawal (Shiota et al., 2011), whereas anecdotal reports of 20 
horror indicate both sympathetic nervous system activation (e.g., nausea, tachycardia) and 21 
autonomic suppression (e.g., tonic immobility; Marx, Forsyth, Gallup, Fusé, & Lexington, 22 
2008).  23 
  
Another limitation of these studies is the use of the emotion labels “awe” and 1 
“horror”, which may have introduced demand characteristics. In particular, the definition of 2 
horror from Study 1 should be tested without emotion labels to ascertain its validity. 3 
Although manipulation checks indicated this definition was adequate to differentiate horror 4 
from awe, it may require clarification to discriminate horror from other negative emotions, 5 
such as defining the elicitor as “shocking” or “against one’s core beliefs or values”.  6 
Although Study 2 used a positive emotion contrast condition, there was no negative 7 
contrast emotion. Previous studies have investigated how awe differs from multiple positive 8 
emotions (Campos et al., 2013; Tong, 2015), but horror requires such clarification, such as 9 
how horror differs from fear and disgust.  10 
Finally, the current study only sampled the US population. Although awe has been 11 
observed across cultures (Bai et al., 2017), because horror is elicited by irreconcilable 12 
contradictions of one’s values or beliefs, it may be salient in cultures with analytic 13 
ontological beliefs (e.g., the “law” of non-contradiction), such as the English-speaking West, 14 
but not in cultures with dialectical ontologies that accept fundamental contradictions (e.g., 15 
East Asia; Peng & Nisbett, 1999).  16 
 Despite their limitations, these studies provide valuable data. First, they show that the 17 
combination of schema-incongruence and NFA describes not just awe, but also horror, thus 18 
introducing the concept of schema-incongruent emotions. Second, they indicate how awe and 19 
horror are distinct emotional responses. Third, these studies are (to our knowledge) the first 20 
empirical examination of horror as a natural emotion and address a gap in the literature,  21 
providing a groundwork for future research. Last, our results problematize the centrality of 22 
NFA in awe, which has been theoretically proposed (Keltner & Haidt, 2003) but not 23 
empirically verified. Future research should investigate the nature of accommodation and 24 
assimilation in awe. For example, awe may involve a type of NFA that the current measures 25 
  
could not capture, such as violations of materialist beliefs and naïve physics. Similarly, 1 
research should localize which aspects of belief and value systems are violated by horror 2 
(e.g., moral imperatives, social trust and conceptualizations of embodiment).  3 
  4 
 5 
  6 
  
Footnotes 1 
[1]Previous psychological research on horror has been limited to “art horror” (e.g., 2 
psychological responses to cinematic fiction), which is different from “natural horror” 3 
towards real-life events (Carroll, 1990).  4 
[2]However trauma and horror are not equivalent. Horror is one potential etiological factor in 5 
PTSD (Dalgleish & Power, 2004), but most horrifying events are not traumatic. 6 
[3]Because we use the terms “awe” and “horror” to denote three different things (study 7 
conditions, Likert emotion ratings, emotions), we use the following conventions to 8 
distinguish between them: study conditions are capitalised (Awe, Horror), emotion ratings are 9 
italicised and lower-case (awe, horror) and emotions (in discussion, not the data) are 10 
unitalicised and lower-case (awe, horror). 11 
[4]Data was collected before publication of Gordon et al. (2017), so their findings on 12 
“certainty” appraisals did not inform our hypotheses. 13 
[5]Because these strict exclusion criteria caused many participants to be excluded, we 14 
separately analyzed data from all participants who missed ≤ 2 attention check questions 15 
(N=212). All results were consistent with those reported here, with no differences in p-16 
values. 17 
[6]Prior to data collection, sample sizes were determined using Cohen (1992)’s rule of thumb 18 
for medium effect sizes for .05 alpha and doubling it to obviate inattentiveness of online 19 
participants.   20 
[7]Note that in Study 1, horror was defined as “vast” for participants, which is inconsistent 21 
with Study 2’s results. When Study 1 was conducted, we assumed schema incongruence in 22 
both awe and horror was “vastness”. Study 2 tested this assumption, but found no support for 23 
it. 24 
[8]Study 1 was part of a larger study that included variables not reported here. 25 
  
[9]Four items were split into two items each: Anticipated Effort-effort (“mental effort”, 1 
“physical effort”), Situation-Control (“fate/destiny was in control”, “chance/coincidence was 2 
in control”), Situation-Responsibility (“fate/destiny was responsible”, “chance/coincidence 3 
was responsible”) and Legitimacy-cheated (“you were cheated”, “someone else was 4 
cheated”). 5 
 [10]Similar to Gordon et al. (2017), the reliability for Personal Agency was low, so separate 6 
t-tests were conducted on “personal control” and “personal responsibility”. For both 7 
individual and composite variables, ratings in Awe were significantly higher than in Horror 8 
(ts ≤ 3.15, ps = .002). 9 
[11]We separately analyzed data from all participants (N=181). All results were entirely 10 
consistent with those reported, including EFA item loadings and ANOVA results (both 11 
omnibus and pairwise). 12 
[12]Sample size was based on Everitt (1975), stipulating a N:p ratio of 10.  13 
[13]To discriminate elicitation by a person from elicitation by a person’s actions, “another 14 
person” was defined as elicitation by a person’s traits or the fact that such a person exists; 15 
elicitation by a person’s actions were coded as “events”. 16 
[14]“Information” included hearing/reading something second-hand or discovering first-hand 17 
evidence (rather than directly witnessing). 18 
[15]Due to a database error, twelve horror scenarios were not coded. 19 
[16]The two-coder alpha for the “event” category was 0.59, so a third coder independently 20 
coded all scenarios for this theme; the three-coder alpha was .69.  21 
[17]KMO=.835, Bartlett’s χ2(91) = 2338, p < .001. Eigenvalues and parallel analysis in SPSS 22 
(O’Connor, 2000) indicated two factors. Four items were removed: social significance and 23 
personal significance (failed to load), power (double-loaded) and physical size/number 24 
  
(communality < .20). The two factors showed good discriminant validity, r=.17 (i.e., shared 1 
2.9% of variation). 2 
[18]KMO=.877 Bartlett’s χ2(45) = 2235, p < .001. Eigenvalues and parallel analysis indicated 3 
two factors. Three items were removed: absorbed (communality <.20), shocked (cross-4 
loaded), easy to understand (cross-loaded). Amazement cross-loaded, but was retained 5 
because the loading difference was almost .40. The two factors were negatively correlated (.-6 
49), sharing 24% of variance.  7 
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